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ABSTRACT. Australia, a leading Antarctic state that played a key role in negotiating the Convention for the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, in May 1989 announced its opposition to the Convention and adoption instead
of a World Park or Wilderness Reserve concept for Antarctica. This article examines possible environmental and
economic reasons for Australia's attitude, which is likely to have significant implications for the future of the Convention
and for the Antarctic Treaty System as a whole.
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One of the most significant developments within the
Antarctic Treaty System in recent times is the successful
negotiation of the Convention for the Regulation of Ant-
arctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) in June
1988. Since the adoption of the Convention, the enthusi-
asm with which it was negotiated has not been matched by
the support of all the Antarctic Treaty states. In a move that
surprised most of the other states, Australia, which is a
leading Antarctic state and one that played a key role in the
negotiation of the Convention, announced in May 1989
that it is opposed to the Convention and that it would rather
support the declaration of Antarctica as a World Park or a
Wilderness Reserve (The Australian 1989a).
In a press statement announcing the Australian posi-
tion, Mr Bob Hawke, the Prime Minister, was careful to
note that, if the Australian initiative is unsuccessful, Aus-
tralia would consider acceding to the Convention.
Nonetheless the Australian announcement met with mixed
responses from other treaty states. The United Kingdom,
New Zealand and the United States expressed disagree-
ment with Australia. The Foreign Minister of New Zea-
land, Mr Russel Marshall, described the Australian deci-
sion as 'dictated by political considerations rather than any
fine feelings about Antarctica' (The Australian 1989b). In
the United Kingdom, the Foreign Office Minister Mr
Timothy Eggar described the Australian decision as disap-
pointing (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 1989). On the
other hand Belgium, France and India indicated their
support for the World Park concept. Belgium described
CRAMRA as 'dangerous and inappropriate' (Hobart
Mercury,! July 1989). The Belgian Parliament also voted
to stop any Belgian national or corporations from mining
or prospecting in Antarctica (ibid.).
The Australian position is significant because Austra-
lia claims 42% of the Antarctic. As an original signatory
of the Antarctic Treaty, Australia is also a leading Consul-
tative Party and without doubt one of the most influential
Antarctic Treaty states. The general view is that all
claimant states will need to ratify or accede to CRAMRA
before it can enter into force. Australia's refusal to ratify
or accede to the Convention could therefore constitute a
veto. Given Australia's influential position, its apparent
rejection of CRAMRA could have significant implica-
tions for the future of the Convention and indeed of the
Antarctic Treaty System as a whole.
Traditionally, Australia has supported Antarctic
Treaty programmes and Consultative Meeting recommen-
dations, and displayed commitment to the Treaty System.
What could be the possible basis for its current position,
that threatens the System so used to a tradition of consen-
sus? This article examines the basis of the Australian
rejection of CRAMRA in favour of the Wilderness Re-
serve concept.
Background to CRAMRA
Since the discovery of mineral deposits in Antarctica
mining prospects have always been a reality. The Antarc-
tic Treaty, adopted in 1959 to regulate specific aspects of
Antarctic activities, made no references to minerals ex-
ploitation nor provided any regime to control resource
activities. At the time of the Treaty's negotiation, these
issues were not considered vital. In any case technology at
the time and the availability of alternative sources for these
resources did not make it commercially attractive to pur-
sue the exploitation of the continent's resources.
In 1982 the Convention for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was con-
cluded to regulate the exploitation of Antarctica's marine
living resources, in the face of mounting pressures, by
some distant-water fishing nations, to exploit the living re-
sources of Antarctica, particularly krill. The issue of
minerals resource exploitation in Antarctica was first
discussed informally by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties (ATCPs) as far back as the Sixth ATC Meeting in
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1970, but it was not until December 1980 that a Special
Meeting was called to discuss the form of the Minerals
Regime and the negotiating process. In March 1981 the
meeting convened again in Buenos Aires and finished just
in time for the Eleventh ATC meeting in the same city in
June 1981. This meeting had the issue of the Minerals
Regime as its main agenda item: its Recommendation XI-
1 was devoted exclusively to the question of a Minerals
Regime for Antarctica. The recommendation called for
the development of the regime 'as a matter of urgency',
and further established a Special ATC Meeting to negoti-
ate a minerals convention.
In June 1982 the Special ATC Meeting started its work
in Wellington, New Zealand. After ten meetings involving
negotiations over six years, the ATCPs adopted
CR AMR A. Throughout the negotiations Australia played
an active role, with one of the sessions being convened in
Hobart, Australia's 'Antarctic city'. Though the records of
the meetings indicate that Australia was among the states
that unsuccessfully sought stringent environmental condi-
tions in the Convention, and the payment of royalties to
claimants, there is no evidence that Australia rejected the
consensus that was reached on the various clauses of the
Convention. At the end of the meeting that adopted
CRAMRA, a Final Report was issued (New Zealand
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988a) which included re-
marks and statements made by several delegates express-
ing their views on the Convention. The report does not
include any statements by Australia nor a statement by any
state objecting to the Convention as such. Indeed the
statements issued after the Conference were generally in
praise of the Convention. One statement which came close
to an objection to the Convention was that of the Nether-
lands, which had participated in the negotiations as an
observer.
The Minerals Regime
The Australian rejection of CRAMRA is based mainly on
what it considers to be faults with the Convention, particu-
larly in the area of the protection of the Antarctic environ-
ment. A brief discussion of the main features of the
Convention is therefore useful in an analysis of the Austra-
lian position.
The full text of the Convention appears in SCAR
Bulletin 94 (printed in Polar Record 1989:264). Mining
activities under the Convention are regulated through a
complex structure of institutions (Blay and Tsamenyi
1989; Beck 1989). The primary institution of the Conven-
tion is the Commission, which is composed of all ATCPs
party to the Convention, sponsoring states which are not
ATCPs and any parties which may be actively engaged in
substantial scientific, technical or environmental research
in the area to which the Convention applies directly rele-
vant to decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activi-
ties (Art. 18). The plenary body under the Convention is
the Special Meeting of Parties which comprises all the
parties to the Convention (Art. 28). CRAMRA also makes
provision for the establishment of Regulatory Committees
in respect of each area to be mined (Art. 29). Each
Regulatory Committee is to be made up of ten members:
six non-claimant states and four claimants including the
claimant in whose area the mining activity is to take place
(Art. 18 (2)). All these institutions are to be assisted by a
Scientific Advisory Committee (Art. 25) and a Secretariat
(Art. 33).
The Convention makes provision for three levels of
mining activities: prospecting, exploration and develop-
ment. Operators need no permits from the institutions of
the Convention to engage in mineral prospecting on the
continent, but any exploration or development activity can
take place only after the issuing of a permit and the
approval of a Management Scheme for such purposes by
the relevant Regulatory Committee. The issuing of the
permit and the approval of the Management Scheme are
subject inter alia to strict environmental conditions.
Environmental conditions
Given the delicate nature of the Antarctic environment, the
negotiation and drafting of CRAMRA required the draw-
ing of a careful balance between the demands to exploit the
continent's resources and the all-important need to pre-
serve its pristine environment. The protection of the
Antarctic environment is therefore made one of the central
objectives of the Convention. Article 4 (1) of the Conven-
tion provides in very clear terms that decisions about
Antarctic mineral resource activities ' ... shall be based
upon information adequate enough to enable informed
judgments to be made about their possible impacts and no
such judgments shall take place unless this information is
available for decisions relevant to those activities'.
In this regard the Convention provides further that no
Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take place unless
it is judged, based upon assessment of its possible impacts
on the Antarctic environment and on dependent and asso-
ciated ecosystems, that the activity shall have no signifi-
cant adverse effects on air and water quality, or cause
significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine
environments, or in the distribution, abundance or produc-
tivity of Antarctic fauna or flora, or the degradation of
areas of special biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or
wilderness significance (Art. 4 (2)). The Convention
further provides that no mineral activity is to take place
unless it is determined that the activity will not affect
global or regional climatic or weather patterns signifi-
cantly (Art. 4 (3)).
Since the use of the appropriate technology is crucial
if the Antarctic environment is to be protected in the course
of any mining activity, the Convention provides that no
mining will take place in Antarctica unless it is judged that
'technology and procedures are available to provide for
safe operations and compliance' with the environmental
conditions under the Convention and there exists the
capacity to monitor key environmental parameters and the
impacts of any resource activity on the environment (Art
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4 (4)). There must also exist the capacity to respond
effectively to environmental accidents before any mining
can be permitted (Art. 4 (4) (c)).
Through the system of issuing permits and the approval
of management schemes, the Regulatory Committees can
maintain an effective control and monitoring system on
resource activities. Decisions in the Regulatory Commit-
tee on the approval of management schemes and the
issuing of permits for development are to be taken by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting
including a simple majority of the claimant states on the
Committee present and voting, plus the US and the USSR,
which are mandatory members on all Regulatory Commit-
tees (Art. 32 (1)). Decisions on all other matters of
substance are to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the
members present and voting (Art. 32 (3)). It follows that
where an application is not supported by the requisite
majority, the Regulatory Committee will not give the
permit or authorization for a requested mineral resource
activity.
The cumulative effect of the decision-making proce-
dures in both the Commission and the Regulatory Com-
mittees is that the members are well placed to prevent
mining in any area of Antarctica if they determine that a
particular activity will be detrimental to the Antarctic
environment or inconsistent with the objectives of the
Convention. Indeed, to the extent that the decision-
making process in the Commission requires consensus for
the identification of an area for mining activity (Art. 22),
any member of the Commission (eg Australia, if it chose
to be party to CRAMRA) could theoretically veto any
mining activity through a negative vote on environmental
or other relevant grounds.
With its stringent conditions, the regime under
CRAMRA provides a good opportunity for a claimant
such as Australia, concerned with the Antarctic environ-
ment, to control and influence mineral resource activities
there within an established framework. These environ-
mental conditions were the product of the stance taken by
Australia and other pro-environmental groups during the
negotiation of the Convention. As the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Senator Evans, admitted in the Senate debate on
CRAMRA:
Throughout the course of the negotiations we (ie
Australia) argued vociferously, vigorously and, for the
most part, pretty effectively for environmental protec-
tion provisions in (the) Treaty which were far-ranging
and of really significant impact in their character. We
wanted strict liability; we wanted unlimited liability;
we wanted narrow defences for anyone who might
engage in such activity and cause environmental
damage in the process; we wanted strict threshold
requirements to be satisfied before people could get in
there and do anything at all; we wanted an effective
enforcement mechanism; and we wanted a substantial
role for the countries with actual territorial claims as
distinct from those who are just drifting around the
edges, so as to enhance our capacity to impose this sort
of regime. I think it has to be said that overwhelmingly
... we have been successful in achieving these various
objectives (Hansard 1989: 1652-53).
This admission by Senator Evans only nineteen days
before the Cabinet's decision not to sign CRAMRA brings
us back to the central issue in this article: given that
CRAMRA provides a legal framework within which each
claimant could play an effective role in the protection of
the Antarctic environment, why has Australia rejected it in
favour of the seemingly unachievable ideal of a Wilder-
ness Reserve?
Australia's responses to CRAMRA
Apart from a few brief reports in the media, the conclusion
of CRAMRA in June 1988 did not attract much publicity
or attention in Australia. Despite the efforts of conserva-
tionist groups to publicize the Convention before and after
its conclusion as a disaster for the Antarctic environment,
the Australian public remained generally unaware of it.
Within Australian government circles there was initially
some evidence of support for the Convention. Mr Michael
Duffy, the then Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Trade, welcomed the Convention indicating that 'Austra-
lia ... placed a high priority on the early conclusion of such
a Convention because of the need to have an effective
international system of control in place well in advance of
any minerals activity in Antarctica' (Australian Foreign
Affairs Record 1988: 258-59).
But disagreements later emerged within the Govern-
ment over the Convention. The Minister for the Environ-
ment, Senator Richardson, and the Foreign Minister,
Senator Evans, favoured Australia's ratification. Both
Senators, while opposed to mining in Antarctica in prin-
ciple, expressed the view that the ratification of CRAMRA
might be the only way to protect the Antarctic environ-
ment. As Senator Evans stated:
What the Convention does is provide a framework for
deciding whether or not [mining] may take place and,
if it's ever approved, for closely regulating it when it
does occur....In fact it provides that mining should not
take place unless it's clear on the basis of objective
criteria that mining will cause no significant environ-
mental harm (Hansard 1989: 1653).
On the other hand the Treasurer, Paul Keating, opposed
Australia's ratification (Hansard 1989: 1647).
In early 1989 the issue of CRAMRA was tabled in the
Australian Parliament for public debate. This heightened
public interest in, and awareness of, CRAMRA and led to
pressures on the Government from different interest
groups. The Australian Mining Industry Council lobbied
the Government to ratify the Convention, arguing that it
was opposed to any move that locked away any area of the
world from future development (The Sun, 23 May 1989).
Australian conservationist groups led by the Australian
Conservation Foundation called on the Government not to
sign CRAMRA in the interest of the Antarctic environ-
ment.
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The conservationists' move in Australia received
considerable support from international conservationists
groups including Greenpeace and the Cousteau Society.
In April 1989 the French naturalist Jacques Cousteau
called on the Australian Government not to sign the
Convention. In a letter addressed to the Australian Prime
Minister he pleaded:
... on behalf of the more than 300,000 members of the
Cousteau Society and Foundation Cousteau, we re-
spectfully call upon you to help in protecting Earth's
last unspoiled continent of Antarctica from the threat
of mineral exploitation ...Next week when your Parlia-
ment meets to consider the Wellington Convention...
Australia will have the unprecedented opportunity to
save Antarctica from the type of devastation that is at
this moment destroying sea life and polluting the
Arctic... [W]e appeal to you to oppose the Convention
(Sydney Morning Herald 18 April 1989).
In an increasingly environmentally conscious Austra-
lia, the preponderance of public opinion appeared to fa-
vour any policy that would oppose mining activity in
Antarctica irrespective of the environmental safeguards in
CRAMRA. By April 1989, the protection of the Antarctic
environment and the propriety of CRAMRA had assumed
major national political significance. The major political
parties sought to gain electoral support by opposing min-
ing in Antarctica and rejecting CRAMRA. In early May
the Liberal-National opposition, which is not traditionally
associated with environmental protection, tabled a motion
in the Senate calling on the Australian Government not to
sign CRAMRA (Hansard 1989:1645-1667). The motion
was passed with the help of the Australian Democrats.
This was followed a day later by a similar motion in the
Victorian Upper House, jointly sponsored by the Liberal,
National and Labour parties and the Independents. The
motion supported 'the principle of Antarctica becoming a
world heritage wilderness park' and called on the Victo-
rian Government to express the opposition of the Victorian
people to Australia becoming a signatory to CRAMRA
(Wilderness News 1999: 15).
The significance of environmental issues and indeed
the question of CRAMRA in Australian politics were
underscored in early May 1989 when the Green Independ-
ents won sufficient seats to hold the balance of power in the
Tasmanian State Parliament in Australia. The Tasmanian
State election had been fought on environmental issues.
The singular success of the Green Independents was there-
fore to be taken as an indicator of community concerns for
the protection of the environment and of future electoral
trends.
Events outside Australia reinforced the environmen-
talists arguments against mining in Antarctica and
CRAMRA generally. In February 1989 an Argentinian
naval ship Bahia Paraiso, with a load of oil became
wrecked in Antarctic waters near Anvers Island and thus
raised fears of possible damage to the Antarctic environ-
ment. Weeks after the incident, newspaper reports of it
spelled gloom for Antarctica. One prominent newspaper
reported it in these terms:
Diesel fuel, almost one million litres of it, is right now
spreading along the frigid Antarctic coast The suffo-
cating black slick, stretching more than 3 km is threat-
ing the wild life rich area with disaster. Penguins are
emerging from the icy depths covered in oil. Their
natural oil glands clogged, they are unable to function
and will die. Other animals such as seals will be
affected by the destruction of krill, the crustacean at the
centre of the Antarctic's food chain (Sydney Morning
Heraldll March 1989).
A month later Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince
William Sound in Alaska, causing considerable damage to
marine life and associated ecosystems over a wide area.
The two incidents provided the basis for the conservation-
ists' argument that whatever the safeguards in CRAMRA
may be, they will not be capable of stopping accidents.
These events, along with the domestic political situation,
set the scene for the formal announcement of Australia's
position on CRAMRA.
In mid-May the Prime Minister announced to the
Australia Mining Industry Council that Australia was
considering not signing the Convention. At a press confer-
ence on 22 May 1988 he formally announced that Austral ia
would not sign CRAMRA. The press statement issued
jointly with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the
Environment read in part:
The Australian Government is dedicated to the com-
prehensive protection of the Antarctic environment
and in that context our strong commitment is that no
mining at all, including oil drilling—should take place
in and around the continent.
Although we recognize that the recently concluded
... CRAMRA is very much better than no protective
regime of any kind in relation to these activities, we
believe that it is both desirable and possible to seek
stronger protection for what remains the world's last
great wilderness. Accordingly, we have decided that
Australia will not sign the Minerals Convention, but
instead will pursue the urgent negotiation of a compre-
hensive environmental protection convention within
the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System. In that
context Australia will specifically explore the pros-
pects for the establishment of an Antarctic 'Wilderness
Park' (Press Statement 22 June 1989).
Reasons for rejecting CRAMRA
The major reason given by the Prime Minister in support
of the Australian position was environmental. However,
since the announcement two other reasons have been
suggested; these are the prospects of subsidised mining
activity in Antarctica, and the absence of any provision for
revenue in CRAMRA for claimants such as Australia.
Environmental reasons
In the press statement to announce the Australian position
on CRAMRA, the Prime Minister pointed to the inadequa-
cies of the Convention protecting the Antarctic environ-
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ment as the principal reason for Australia's rejection of
CRAMRA. Since the announcement, neither the Prime
Minister nor any Government official has elaborated on
these inadequacies. In a speech to the National Press Club
in Washington, the Prime Minister emphasized the inade-
quacies of the Convention in general terms without refer-
ence to any specific details. He simply noted that:
Australia has recently decided not to sign the Antarctic
Minerals Convention because we did not believe that
it provided proper safeguards against damage to this
the last pristine continent We believe all mining
activity in Antarctica should be banned. We seek
instead a comprehensive Antarctic environment pro-
tection convention and the creation of a wilderness
reserve (Ministerial Document Service 8).
The Prime Minister then went on to explain the details
of such a convention. Australian conservation movements
have, however, been more specific in their critique of the
Convention, identifying the following as some of its inade-
quacies.
First, it is argued that the Convention does not delimit
the extent of liability for environmental damage (Moore
1988: 22-23). This is to be done later in a protocol to be
established under the Convention. Conservationists argue
that under pressure from operators applying for mining
permits, the liability provisions to be included in the
proposed protocol will be subject to interpretation and
ultimately less stringent rules may be adopted to favour
operators.
It is also argued that the protocol may provide limits
to the liability of operators and defences against liability.
The basis of this argument is that the CRAMRA provisions
on environmental damage exclude liability for natural
disasters of exceptional character which could not rea-
sonably have been foreseen and those caused as a result of
armed conflict and acts of terrorism. Groups opposed to
the Convention argue that 'conservationists and scientists
who have wide knowledge and experience of the Antarctic
and sub-Antarctic region are hard pressed to think of any
natural disaster that could be classified as exceptional or
unforseen' (ibid.).
Another argument fundamental to the conservation-
ists' position is that, even if the liability provisions of the
intended protocol were to be stringent, it may be practi-
cally impossible to repair any resultant damage. This, it is
argued, is well evidenced by the Exxon Valdez accident in
Prince William Sound. The logical extension of these
arguments is that it is prudent to abolish all mining activity
on Antarctica.
These views provided a basis for Australia's rejection
of the Convention. Other statements by the Prime Minister
since the press statement endorsed the concern of the
conservationists. In a statement on the environment Mr
Hawke indicated that a degradation of any part of the
Antarctic environment could destroy the entire ecosystem
of Antarctica with far-reaching global implications and
that '[t]he grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska is
testimony to the damage than an oil spill can do to such an
environment' (Hobart Mercury 21 July 1989). In the
opinion of the Australian Government, mining or oil
drilling is not consistent with the protection of the Antarc-
tic environment.
The current Australian position is hard to reconcile
with past official statements indicating Australia's Ant-
arctic policies. Successive Australian governments have
usually taken the general position that Australia would
pursue and derive any reasonable economic benefits from
the living and non-living resources available in the Antarc-
tic, while seeking at the same time to protect the
continent's environment, and that the idea of an Antarctic
World Park was not realistic. Senator Evans, now the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, once described the idea of
Antarctica as a World Park as a 'dream of elves and fairies'
when he was Minister for Resources and the Environment
(Conservation News 1989). In a statement on the environ-
ment entitled Our country, our future, released by the
Prime Minister's Office in July 1989, the Government
explained the apparent inconsistency in its policy with the
statement that, consistent with its decision not to allow
mining in Antarctica, it had amended previous Australian
policy in favour of a comprehensive protection of the
Antarctic environment and a complete ban on mining.
Economic reasons
Australia's rejection of CRAMRA is partly motivated by
economic considerations. Australia is a leading producer
of some of the minerals that may be mined in Antarctica.
There is a concern within the Australian Treasury that
CRAMRA does not provide sufficient safeguards to pro-
tect the Australian mining industry against competition
from Antarctic mineral resource activities. In particular it
is argued that the absence of an anti-subsidy provision in
CRAMRA may be inimical to Australia's interest. The
worry seems to be that without a provision on anti-subsidy
it is likely that some nations would subsidize their compa-
nies operating in Antarctica with the result that minerals
could be dumped on the world market.
During the negotiations on CRAMRA Australia and a
number of ATS sought unsuccessfully to have an anti-
subsidy clause in the Convention. In the end the Final
Report simply noted that:
The Meeting recognized that unfair economic prac-
tices including certain forms of subsidies could cause
adverse effects to the interests of Parties to the Conven-
tion and that such effects should be addressed in the
context of the relevant multilateral agreements. To
this end, the Meeting agreed that Parties to the Con ven-
tion which are also Parties to such multilateral agree-
ments will determine conditions of application of these
agreements to the Antarctic mineral resource activities
(New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988b:
2-3).
Another economic reason which influenced
Australia's position on CRAMRA is the absence of royalty
provisions in the Convention for claimants such as Austra-
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lia. During the negotiations on CRAMRA, the claimant
states persistently sought the payment of royalties for any
mineral resource activities within their sectors. At an
Informal Group Meeting convened in Montevideo under
the direction of Arthur Watts of the United Kingdom to
consider how to finance the institutions of the Convention
and what to do with any profits that may accrue from
mining activities on the continent, the issue of royalties
was discussed at length. The claimants viewed their rights
to an automatic share of revenue from minerals activities
as an important aspect of the 'internal accommodation' in
the evolving minerals regime. It was argued that such a
share was based on their presumed 'right to tax activities
in their respective areas, general compensation for deroga-
tion of sovereignty rights, or payments for the special
management role to be assumed by claimants' under the
regime (Antarctic Briefing 1987: 9).
These demands were rejected by non-claimants; in-
deed some were vehemently opposed to even discussing
the issue since any concession on the question of royalties
to claimants would have amounted to an implicit or a de
facto recognition of the territorial claims in Antarctica.
The negotiations thus ended without any financial conces-
sions to claimants such as Australia. The point in issue
here is that, in the absence of any substantive economic
benefits, Australia left the negotiations at the end of the day
dissatisfied and that the situation provided the basis for its
rejection of CRAMRA later in May 1989. The Australian
Treasurer Mr Keating confirmed this in a letter he wrote to
the Foreign Minister Senator Evans, in which he argued:
I do not believe that Australia should sign the Conven-
tion until we attempt further to negotiate provisions
that better protect our national interesL...[S]ignature
would mean we would, in effect, concede our eco-
nomic claims over Antarctica for virtually nothing,
forfeiting our sovereignty over Antarctica and opening
up the possibility of subsidized production competing
with Australian mineral producers... (Hansard 1989:
1647).
Conclusion and overview
Three reasons have been given for Australia's rejection of
CRAMRA. In our view the economic arguments based on
the absence of anti-subsidy and royalty provisions in
CRAMRA are of relative significance in any proper as-
sessment of Australia's position on the Convention.
Australia entered and left the negotiations aware that it
could not realistically expect any substantial concessions
on the issues of sovereignty rights and the entrenchment of
anti-subsidy provisions in the Convention. One can hardly
use the economic factors as the substantive bases for
Australia's refusal to sign or ratify the Convention. In-
deed, it is instructive to note that Australia has not publicly
used these economic arguments as the justification for its
rejection of CRAMRA.
So far the stated official reasons for Australia's rejec-
tion of the Convention have been environmental. As we
have indicated, the World Park concept was earlier re-
jected by Australia; but Australia has explained its change
of policy on the grounds that new evidence suggests that
the Antarctic environment is too fragile to accommodate
mineral resource activities. The current Australian posi-
tion may well have been dictated by a genuine commit-
ment by the present Labour Government to protect the
Antarctic environment. However, in Australia where
environmental issues are becoming politically significant,
the electoral advantages that the Government stands to
gain cannot be overlooked. Given the political realities in
Australia, the Government's position is understandable
and indeed quite pragmatic.
It knows that it may well be impossible to secure
agreement for a World Park in Antarctica; but for domestic
political purposes the World Park concept has an unmis-
takable appeal. Since the Convention would take a long
time to come into force it makes little political sense to
antagonize the environmentally-conscious Australian
electorate by pursuing signature of CRAMRA. In this
regard it is important to note that Australia has left open its
option to accede to CRAMRA at a future date if it fails to
gain international support for the Wilderness Reserve
proposal. It is also of interest to note that the Minister for
the Environment has stated on more than one occasion
that, in his view, mining in Antarctica is inevitable (The
Sun 23 May 1989) and that 'the only way you'll stop them
(ie other nations from mining in Antarctica) will be if you
attempt to send in the gunboats' (JheSunS July 1989). For
the moment, however, the Australian Government prefers
to be seen by its electorate as being environmentally re-
sponsible in Antarctica by rejecting the idea of mining on
the continent.
In place of the CRAMRA, Australia is seeking a
comprehensive Antarctic Environment Protection Con-
vention, '... the principal objective of which would be the
conservation and protection of Antarctica's unique envi-
ronment and its associated ecosystems' (Ministerial
Document Service 1989). In his speech to the National
Press Club in Washington, and again at the Australian
Institute of International Affairs Conference on Antarctica
in Hobart in November 1989, the Prime Minister ex-
plained (ibid.)\he main elements of such a convention as
follows:
• an agreement to protect Antarctica's environment
and its scientific value;
• a ban on mining;
• arrangements to which will allow an assessment of
proposed Antarctic activities or facilities;
• a means of determining whether sufficient knowl-
edge exists to enable adequate impact assessment;
• an agreement not to undertake activities where there
is insufficient knowledge to judge whether they are en-
vironmentally sound;
• criteria and standards to enable those judgments to be
made..
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The convention proposed by the Prime Minister would
allow some activities in Antarctica but would ban mining
altogether. In this regard, the proposed convention will
differ significantly from CRAMRA. The basis of the
complete ban on mining is that mining is incompatible
with the idea of a Wilderness Reserve. In this regard, the
Australian position on Antarctica seems inconsistent with
aspects of its domestic environmental policies. In the case
of Coronation Hill in the Kakadu National Park for in-
stance, the Government appears quite willing to accom-
modate resource exploitation within its framework of
environmental protection regime for the area. It is a
position which undermines the Government's view that
minerals exploitation is inconsistent with the notion of a
Wilderness Reserve in Antarctica.
In relation to CR AMR A itself, there is the general view
that ratification or accession by all claimants is required to
bring the Convention into force. The view is based on
Article 62 of CRAMRA which provides that the ' ...
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
following the deposit of the instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession by 16 Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties which participated as in the final
session of the Fourth Special Antarctic Consultative Meet-
ing, provided that number includes all the states necessary
to establish all of the institutions of the Convention in
respect of every area of Antarctica, including five develop-
ing countries and 11 developed countries'. As a claimant
state, Australia* s membership on any Regulatory Commit-
tee to be formed in respect of the Australian sector is
mandatory under the terms of the Convention. It therefore
follows that without Australia such a Regulatory Commit-
tee cannot be formed. The view is that in such a case a vital
condition under Article 62 cannot be fulfilled; the Conven-
tion can, therefore, not enter into force. The Australian
rejection of the Convention would thus constitute a veto.
This view that Australia can veto CRAMRA is debat-
able. If Australia can indeed veto the Convention, then it
would follow that, by its repeated statements that it would
not sign it, the Convention has become a dead letter. But
despite the Australian position, current indications are that
CRAMRA is not dead. At the Fifteenth ATC Meeting in
Paris in October 1989, Australia actively pursued the
Wilderness Reserve concept and tabled proposals for a
comprehensive Antarctic Environment Convention. The
Meeting adopted a Recommendation sponsored jointly by
Australia and France that' ... a Special Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting be held in 1990 to explore and
discuss all proposals relating to the comprehensive protec-
tion of the Antarctic environment and its dependent eco-
systems' (Rec. XV-1). However, the Meeting also
adopted another Recommendation to the effect that a
meeting be held in 1990 to explore and discuss all propos-
als relating to Article 8 (7) of CRAMRA (Rec. XV-2).
Article 8 (7) relates to the adoption of a separate protocol
in respect of the liability provisions of CRAMRA. Since
there will be little point in meeting to discuss the details of
such a protocol in 1990 if CRAMRA is a dead letter, it
seems reasonable to conclude that, by adopting Recom-
mendation XV-2, the ATCPs still consider CRAMRA as
an active document notwithstanding the Australian posi-
tion.
It is of interest to note that so far neither Australia nor
France has declared CRAMRA dead because of their
opposition to it. But if indeed they do have a veto and the
Convention is dead, the implications would be significant
for the Antarctic Treaty system as a whole in the 1990s.
Even though the 'hands-off, no mining' approach being
championed by Australia has attracted the support of some
ATCPs, it has also attracted considerable opposition from
influential ATCPs such as the United Kingdom and the
United States. If CRAMRA is dead because of the absence
of consensus, Australia can hardly expect to gain the
consensus it will need to negotiate, let alone implement,
the proposed comprehensive Antarctic Environmental
Convention which includes a ban on mining. It is a
situation that could destroy the consensus approach to
negotiations which has been a traditional features among
the ATS.
The death of CRAMRA could well mark a turning
point in the relations between the ATS. In specific terms,
the disunity Australia's position is likely to create may
well herald a review of the Antarctic Treaty in the period
after 1991. The irony is that if CRAMRA does not come
into force and the Australian proposal for a Wilderness
Reserve is not adopted, the situation could leave mineral
resource activities in Antarctica unregulated with all the
attendant risks to the Antarctic environment.
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